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WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
(Herein of Future Inferesfs)-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
W. J. BOWE*
INTESTACY
Interest of Surviving Spouse: It has been suggested in an earlier
article' that the intestate laws of the State of Tennessee are in need
of revision. It seems absurd to make the distributive share of a sur-
viving spouse depend on whether the property owned by the decedent
is real estate or personalty. Assume, for example, a husband, whose
sole substantial asset is a large apartment house worth $100,000, dies
childless, leaving a wife and brother. The wife is entitled to her
dower interest for life, nothing more. If she is about 50 or 55 years
of age the value of her share in the estate will run somewhere be-
tween $15,000 and $20,000. The brother whom the decedent may not
have seen for 20 years will inherit the bulk of the estate. But suppose
the husband had incorporated his real estate so that what he owned
at the time of his death was all the issued and outstanding shares of
Apartment House, Inc. Under these circumstances the wife is entitled
to the entire estate. Why should the form in which the real estate
is held make all the difference? The plight of the childless husband is
even worse. If his deceased wife had owned the apartment house he
would receive nothing since his right to curtesy arises only if the
couple were blessed with issue. On the other hand, if the wife owned
all the stock of the corporation owning the apartment house, the hus-
band, if there are no children, inheritg all his wife's estate. Warmath
v. Smith2 involved the estate of a deceased wife whose sole asset was
a 15 acre tract of land. There were no children. The land was devised
to persons other than her husband. He objected to the probate of the
will on the ground of lack of capacity, claiming to be a beneficiary
under an earlier will which had been accidentally lost or destroyed.
However, he had not instituted any action to set up the prior will.
Under these circumstances the court properly held he had no standing
to contest the probate since: (1) he would take nothing by intestacy,
and (2) no action had been commenced to establish the validity
of the spoliated will. For these reasons it did not appear that he
was an interested party and, obviously, a stranger to an estate will
not be heard to question the validity of a will.
Advancements: One Thornton conveyed real estate to his wife for
life with a provision that, upon her death, the land was to revert to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV.
1126, 1128 (1953).
2. 279 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1955).
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him, if living, otherwise to his son Freed, his heirs and assigns for-
ever.3 He died intestate and his other son Raymond, one of his heirs,
claimed, among other things, that the inclusion of Freed as a contingent
grantee constituted an advancement. There was testimony of step-
sisters, neighbors, and of one who resided in the home of Thornton,
that he did not intend the transfer as an advancement, Thornton having
told the witnesses that he had included Freed in the conveyance be-
cause "he had been out so much money" to his other son, Raymond.
The Tennessee statute creates a rebuttable presumption that any
transfer or conveyance of property to a child shall be treated as an
advancement. 4 The above evidence would seem adequate to rebut
the presumption but the court went further and stated that, without
regard to this evidence, the transfer was not to be so treated since
an advancement must be irrevocable and in presentae.5 Query, if
this language may not be misleading and cause confusion in later
cases. American case law does not require that an advancement be
irrevocable. Thus the proceeds of a life insurance policy, though the
decedent retained the right to change the beneficiary, has been
treated as an advancement.6 Further, future interests may constitute
an advancement as where Father conveys Blackacre to son, reserving
a life estate.7 It should also be noted that the transfer in the instant
case was not subject to revocation by the grantor. The result, however,
seems correct since the deed of gift with the retained reversionary in-
terest, preceding the contingent executory interest to the son, may
well be thought of as inconsistent with an intent to make an advance-
ment.
Right of Divorced Parent to Inherit from Child: Our statute pro-
vides that where the parents of a person dying intestate have been
divorced by a decree which committed the custody of such person to
one of the parents to the exclusion of the other, then the personal
estate of such person shall be distributed to such parent to whom the
custody has been committed, if such person leaves no husband, wife
or children surviving 8
In Shelton v. Shelton9 a decree of divorce in April 1942 committed
the care and custody of the decedent to his father "temporarily until
October 1942 Term of this Court, at which time the Court will make
further orders regarding the custody of said minor." Neither party
made any further application and the minor continued in the custody
of his father until his death, 8 years later. The child was then 20
3. Thornton v. Thornton, 282 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App. W. S. 1955).
4. TENN. CODE-ANN. § 31-702 (1956).
5. Thornton v. Thornton, 282 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
6. ATKInsoN, WiLLs 720 (2d ed. 1953).
7. Id. at 724.
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-201 (1956).
9. 280 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. 1955).
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years of age and unmarried. The court held both parents were entitled
to share in a wrongful death recovery because the mother still had
the status of next of kin since no permanent award of custody had
been made. The decision seems sound in view of the judicial policy
of very strictly construing statutes which deprive any person in the
bloodline of his inheritance.'0
Misconduct of an heir will not prevent him from sharing in an
estate. The cases have held that a father may inherit from a child
even where he has denied the paternity or has abandoned the child."
Similarly by the weight of authority, absent a statute, a person wrong-
fully killing another may inherit, if otherwise entitled under the in-
testacy laws. Where statutes change these rights they have been
narrowly construed to deny inheritance only in cases clearly covered
by such statutes.'2
Effect of Later Discovered Will: In First Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n. v. Dearth13 the decedent had owned real estate, upon the secur-
ity of which his heirs borrowed shortly after his death, the lender and
the heirs assuming the decedent had died without leaving a will. The
loan was made three months and eight days after her death on the
basis of affidavits of heirship and intestacy, no formal administration
having been had. An earlier Tennessee case, Wright v. Eakin,14 had
protected a bona fide purchaser from the heir in a case where the
lost will came to light 19 years after the death. While the weight of
authority is contra 15 the holding of the Wright case appears sound;
otherwise titles may be left unsettled indefinitely or at least until a
title by adverse possession can be established. But the instant case
denied the lender any protection. The short period of time plus the
lack of evidence showing diligence in searching for a will, failed to
satisfy the good faith requirement. Each case will thus depend on
its own facts. The problem is not easy of solution. Titles ought not
be left uncertain for long periods. Buyers ought to be able to rely on
the record. On the other hand, innocent devisees ought not to lose
their inheritances because of delays in the discovery of wills. No
general rule can be laid down without doing injustice in many cases.
The court's solution in examining the facts in each case seems pref-
erable, on balance, to the rule in many other jirisdictions that bona
fide purchasers from heirs, where there is no adjudication of intestacy,
are not entitled to the property against devisees of later probated
wills.16
10. See ATKnxsON, WILLS 147 (2d ed. 1953).
11. In re Green's Estate, 197 Iowa 1169, 196 N.W. 993 (1924).
12. Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953) (claimant convicted
of manslaughter, statute provided forfeiture for murder).
13. 279 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1955).
14. 151 Tenn. 681, 270 S.W. 992 (1925).





Undue Influence: Not all influence is improper. One court, answer-
ing the argument that the legatee "had carried on a campaign to se-
cure for himself the estate" of an elderly relative, said, "Fortunately
for aged widows, though sometimes unfortunately for their next of
kin, the law does not penalize such campaigns.' u7 Our supreme court
recognized in Halle v. Summerfield18 that there is no presumption of
invalidity because of the exercise of influence by a daughter to induce
her father to execute a new will in her favor. However, the exercise
of influence later the same day by the son to cause the reinstatement
of an earlier will by the revocation of the new will was likewise re-
garded as permissible. a
There are four elements usually required to establish undue in-
fluence: (1) a weak mind subject to influence, (2) an opportunity to
exercise the influence, (3) a disposition to unduly influence to effect
a wrongful favor, and (4) a result appearing to be the effect of
the influence.19 The disposition to influence means more than an
effort to obtain a greater share at the expense of another. It implies a
willingness to do something unfair or shocking to bring about the
result. As one court put it: "Undue influence ... denotes something
wrong according to the standard of morals which the law enforces
in the relations of men, and therefore something legally wrong,
something, in fact, illegal. '20 This statement is not very helpful but
is indicative of the extreme vagueness of the concept. In the instant
case the disposition was in accord with a long settled plan of the
testator. This in itself was enough to counteract the effect of the con-
fidential relationship between father and son growing out of a long
established business association, plus the fact that the son's lawyer
drew the instrument that revoked the daughter-inspired will. How-
ever, where a confidential relationship exists extreme care should be
taken. Here the son had the good sense not to be present at the time
the revoking will was executed. If he had been present the result might
well have been different. Legatees will be well advised not to be
over-active in the preparation and execution of wills, lest the instru-
ments be thought of as expressing their wishes rather than those
of their benefactors. Lawyers, in particular, should refrain from
drafting instruments in which they are named as beneficiaries. Where
a prospective legatee seeks out a lawyer to draft a will, the lawyer
ought to interview the testator privately, arranging for the legatee to
be far distant from the place of the interview and the place of execu-
tion.
17. MacMillan v. Knost, 126 F.2d 235, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
18. 287 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. 1956).
19. See In re Leisch's Will, 221 Wis. 641, 267 N.W. 268 (1936).
20. Morris v. Morris, 192 Miss. 519, 520, 6 So. 2d 311, 312 (1942).
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Formalities in the Execution of Wills: A will that undoubtedly ex-
pressed the desires of the testator and executed under circumstances
that precluded any possibility of fraud, undue influence or lack of
capacity came into question in Needham v. Doyle.21 The will, in
every respect fair on its face and containing an attestation clause,
was attacked on the ground of failure to publish and declare the
instrument to be a will. Testimony of one of the witnesses suggested
he might have signed without having been told that he was witnessing
a will. "I wouldn't say he [the testator] said come and sign a will.
I signed the paper there in his office and in a few days-I don't know
just how long it was-he asked me did I know what I signed and he
told me it was a will." 2 Other evidence indicated that the witness
may have been made conscious of the nature of the document.2
Further the attestation clause raised a presumption that the recitals
of due execution were true. The supreme court, reversing the trial
judge, who had directed a pre-emptory instruction against the will,
held the question of publication should have been submitted to the
jury. Query, in view of the litigation during the last few years24 if the
publication requirement should be retained in the statute. Most
American jurisdictions do not require that the testator signify the
instrument to be his will and commentators have criticized the added
formality on the ground of the undesirability of overturning a will
because the testator omitted to declare the testamentary character
of the paper or because a witness failed to remember his statement
to that effect.2
Joint Wills: Another source of fertile litigation has been the joint
will, i.e., a will in which the same paper is executed by two persons
as their respective wills. Testators seem to prefer joint wills to mu-
tual wills because the risk of revocation by one without the knowledge
of the other is believed to be substantially reduced. However, the
drafting of a joint will creates difficult problems in attempting to ex-
press the individual intentions of each testator. In McDaniel v.
Owens2 6 the paper writing, wholly in the handwriting of the husband,
except for the signature of his wife, read as follows:
Nov 21 1943
Hear is Our Will At Our death All in Our name goes to W M Owens
and Elvis Owens at our Death. All the land of 132 acres in the 11 dis-
21. 286 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. App. W. S. 1955).
22. Id. at 606.
23. "I really thought that was what it was, but to say knowing it, I wouldn't
say I personally knowed it was a will." Id. at 609.
24. Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV.
977 (1954); Bowe, Wills, Estates and Trusts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L.
REV. 1126 (1953).
25. ATKmNSON, WILLS 328 (2d ed. 1953).
26. 281 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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trict of Gibson County. And all the Bank Shears in Farmers &
Merchant Bank. Everything Else goes to them at Our Death for




The paper was found in an envelope on which was printed: "Its
inside." On the outside of the envelope in the husband's handwriting
appeared the following: "This is not to be opened until our death.
P. P. Owens and Anna." The court quite properly treated the en-
velope as part of the will. It also held the will to be a valid holograph
of P. P. Owens, on whose death the document was offered for probate,
since the words, "and Anna" were immaterial and surplusage.
Probate, however, was denied because the court found an intent
that the writing was not to be effective until the death of the survivor.
It is well settled in Tennessee and elsewhere that a joint will may be
regarded as the will of each cotestator and may be probated twice,
once at each death. But if the expressed or implied intent is that the
will is not to be probated until the death of the survivor it is invalid
on the theory that the estate of the decedent may not be held in
abeyance until the later event occurs. Generally, it is possible to
construe the words of the testament as creating a life estate in the
survivor with no intention to postpone the operation of the will. Per-
haps the language in the Owens' document too strongly suggested
that it was not to become operative until the second death; but query,
if the court might not have used its interpretative power to find an in-
tent only to postpone possession and enjoyment of the ultimate legatee,
not probate and administration. This would have caused a life estate
for the life of the survivor to go by intestacy or a life estate to the
survivor might have been implied. Either result would seem pref-
erable to complete intestacy. And courts have and can do wonderful
things when they begin the process of interpreting the inept words
of lay draftsman.
Lost Wills: A will, lost, mutilated or destroyed, without intent to
revoke, may be admitted to probate upon satisfactory proof of its
contents and due execution. If the will was last known to be in the
possession of the testator and cannot be found it is presumed to have
been destroyed with intent to revoke. But no such presumption arises
if the will is shown to have been in the possession of another. In
Wall v. Millsaps28 the court recognized these common-law principles.
TRUSTS
Oral Trusts: The seventh section of the Statute of Frauds is not
in effect in Tennessee. Hence a trust of real estate may be created
27. Id. at 260.
28. 286 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. 1955).
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orally. In Brantley v. Brantley29 after the death of the father, the
children claimed they conveyed land to their mother so that she
could obtain loans on the property to improve it. It was alleged she
agreed to repay the loans and reconvey the interests to the children.
It was further alleged that she failed to adhere to the agreement. Held,
the bill stated facts sufficient to impress a trust upon the realty.30
FUTURE INTERESTS
Rule Against Perpetuities: In Crockett v. Scott 3' the Court had oc-
casion to reaffirm three basic perpetuity rules:
1. Men and women are considered as capable of having children
as long as they live.
2. The rule is predicated on what conceivably might happen rather
than on what actually happens or is likely to happen.
3. Where a gift to any member of a class fails, the entire gift to
the class fails.3
2
The will of the testatrix in the Crockett case gave her estate to her
sister A for life, upon A's death, to A's then living children and a niece
C, for their lives and "after their death to their children free and dis-
charged of any further trust, And if any of my sister's children or
said [C] should die without children, his or their share to go to its
next of kin. After my sister's death said property is to go to her
children and the heirs of such as may be dead and said [C] per
capita and not per stirpes for and during their lives and after their
death to their children if they have any and if they have none to
their next of kin."' '
Thus sister A was given a life estate. This was followed by life
estates to A's then living children and to C, with remainder to the
grandchildren of A and the children of C. At the time of the testa-
trix's death her sister A was 50. She had six children, one of whom
predeceased her. C, at the death of the testatrix, was 13 and resided
in the household of A.
Gray's classic definition of the Rule Against Perpetuities states, "No
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." It is not
sufficient that it probably will vest or in the light of subsequent events
29. 281 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. 1955).
30. For a further discussion of oral trusts, see Bowe, Wills, Estates and
Trusts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 977, 982 (1954).
31. 284 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1955).
32. "To this doctrine there are two exceptions: first, where there is a gift
of a stated amount to each member of the class; and, second, where there is
a gift to a class, the membership in which is certain to be determined within
the period of the rule, and this is followed by a gift over of the share of each
member of the class, or of the share from which each member of the class
has been given income, to his children, issue, heirs or the like." SIMEs, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 387 (1951).
33. 284 S.W.2d at 290.
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it would have vested within the period. There must, as of the date
the interest is created, be no possibility that it could fail. Looking
at the instant bequest, the remainder is bad. A's life may not be
used as the measuring life since her children might survive her by
more than 21 years and hence delay vesting in the grandchildren be-
yond the permissible period. The lives of A's children and C may not
be used since it is possible that all of A's children might die and others
be born and live beyond 21 years. These latter would have life estates,
good since they must vest at the death of A (a life in being at the
creation of the interest) but bad as to the grandchildren, since, if this
remote contingency occurred, the vesting of the estates in the grand-
children would be delayed beyond a life in being and 21 years.
It was argued that the gift to C's children was valid since it must
vest at the termination of C's life. But the court quite properly held
that this was a class gift as the testator was obviously group-minded. 34
It is well settled that a class gift, subject to certain recognized excep-
tions,35 is treated as a unit for the purposes.of the rule; if it is bad as
to any possible member of the class it is bad as to all.
The rule too often operates as a trap. It rarely prevents desired
dispositions since the average testator wants only to benefit or restrict
those he knows. It is hard to have favorable or unfavorable opinions
about those not yet born. Since testators are primarily interested in
their children and grandchildren rather than in more remote genera-
tions, and since violations of the rule are generally inadvertent, wills
and trusts ought to contain a protective clause such as the following:
Notwithstanding the directions heretofore given my Trustee as to the
distribution of income and principal, the trust established by this will
shall terminate, if it has not previously terminated, 21 years after the
date of the death of the last survivor of my wife, my children and any
grandchildren of mine in being at the date of my death and my trustee
shall pay over the then remaining principal and any undistributed in-
come to those of my lineal descendants then living, per stirpes.
A bequest to those of my nieces who survive distribution of my
estate is generally held bad since conceivably the estate may not be
distributed for 22 years, and all nieces living at the testator's death
may die the next day and a new niece be conceived and born. The
suggested clause, with variations to specify the estate rather than the
trust, and nieces living at the testator's death as the measuring lives,
would save such a gift, since we may safely assume distribution will
in fact take place within a few years, certainly within 21 years after
the deaths of all nieces living at the date of the testator's death. Such
a clause will effectuate the intent of the testator in practically all
cases since gifts are voided in most instances because of some fanciful
34. Snvis, op. cit. supra note 32 at 289.
35. Ibid.
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possibility which every one knows will never occur. In the instant case
it would have achieved the decedent's objective since five of her
sister's children and C survived her and no further childrenwere
born. Thus distribution would have been made under the dispositive
clause and not under the protective clause.
Construction: In Johnson v. Speer36 Item 4 of the will of a Mrs.
Potter read as follows:
I give and devise unto my sister, Lotta S. Johnson, the real estate and
improvements owned by me in Memphis, Tennessee, known as Eight
Hundred Fourteen (814) Court Avenue; provided, however,, that in
the event my said sister should predecease my brother,, Charles E.
Speer, then the said property shall vest in and belong to him.37
Lotta, whose brother survived her, conveyed the real estate in fee
during her life and the litigation involved her grantee's title. Lotta
had more than life estate but less than an indefeasible fee. Technically,
she had a fee simple subject to a shifting use in her brother. Interests
such as his were early recognized as indestructible. It was these
early holdings that prompted the courts to announce the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
As Lotta predeceased her brother, the fee shifted to him. The
grantee argued that the will should be construed to mean that the
brother was to take only if Lotta died before the testatrix. But the
court noted that in other parts of the will the testatrix had'clearly
expressed this intent where she had it. Thus in one item she gave
property to her brother "if he survives me"; in another, she gave
property to grandchildren and "if either predeceased me"; etc. In
view of the careful phraseology the court ruled, out any possibility
of an intent to limit the gift over to her brother, only if Lotta failed
to survive testatrix. This case indicates that the will draftsman should
not aspire to the literary excellence that dictates changes in the form
of language where identical ideas are being expressed. Exact repeti-
tion of words, rather than use of synonyms, may become monotonous
in English composition but it is a quality much to be desired in wills.
36. 279 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954)
37. Id. at 712.
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